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Abstract 
Berlin Brandenburg Airport exemplifies the impact of poor decisions in projects. Extant 
research on behavioural decision making in project contexts offers a variety of explanations for 
poor decisions. However, the research sheds only spotlights on the field. It could benefit from a 
stronger coverage of theories in cognitive and social psychology and integration of findings and 
concepts across theoretical traditions. Drawing on the developments of Behavioural Strategy, this 
paper proposes the concept of ‘Behavioural Projects’ as a host of the growing body of research on 
behavioural decision making in projects. We organise extant research in a conceptual framework 
rooted in three schools of thinking - psychological (reductionist), political (pluralist) and social 
(contextualist). We illustrate how the three schools and their integration provide ample research 
opportunities through an analysis of decisions in the Berlin Brandenburg Airport fiasco. Based on our 
framework, we propose a research program that serves as inspiration for future studies on the 
crossroads between cognitive and social psychology theories and decision situations in projects. We 
hope that such future research will give rise to the development of an integrated behavioural decision 
making theories for temporary organisations. 
1. Introduction 
Berlin Brandenburg Airport exemplifies the impact of poor decisions in projects. The 
infrastructure project has been a constant source of outrage since its originally scheduled 
opening in 2011. Public media argues that the project suffered under overly ambitious plans 
and constant scope change. For example, the airport company initiated major changes at late 
stages in the project. Subcontractors could no longer keep up with the cascading effects 
generated by such constant changes, and even asked for a temporary suspension of 
construction work, which has been denied. While the current tentative opening date has been 
moved to 2017, projected costs have tripled to 5.4b EUR and the list of defects keeps getting 
longer and longer (Hammer, 2015). Why did Schwarz, the airport CEO, change the scope so 
frequently? Why did von Gerkan, the architect – considered among the best in Germany – 
accept such extravagant changes throughout project execution? Why were main contractors’ 
concerns not listened to? 
Behind the situation sketched above lies a series of poor decisions. Behavioural 
decision making and its applications to organizational contexts offer a variety of explanations 
to such challenges. As one would expect, there has been a tradition of studies of decisions and 
behaviours in decisions in project contexts, such as works around escalation of commitment, 
optimism bias, recognition of early warning signs, etc. In a comprehensive literature review 
on project management, Söderlund proposes decision school as one of the seven schools in 
project management research (Söderlund, 2011). Some of this body of research, most notably 
Flyvbjerg’s work, has not only informed project management practice and theory but also 
influenced the literature on behavioural decision making itself.  
However, although decisions mark the development of each and every project, from 
sanction to hand-over, and are a fundamental task of every project manager and steering 
committee, past studies in the area were limited in number. This is now changing. In recent 
years, the number of articles in the field is increasing fast, and they have turned into a 
significant body of research that wards a review. In a structured literature review within the 
International Journal of Project Management and Project Management Journal (Stingl and 
Geraldi, Work in Progress), we identified 58 articles in total focusing on behavioural decision 
making in projects, and 39 of them were after 2010.  
However, our literature review suggests that the extant research has three gaps. First, it 
remains focused on restricted types of decision problems and explanation theories. Taken 
together, the studies still did not exhaust the varying relevant theories proposed in the general 
literature on behavioural decision making, and hence the field has plenty of opportunities for 
future research. Second, although studies acknowledge one another at least within the field of 
projects, they consider different explanation for decision behaviour side by side rather than 
developing integrated frameworks that suggest how different factors reinforce one another. 
Such approach can potentially foster middle range theorising which can contribute both to the 
theory and practice of projects, and behavioural decision making theories. Finally, there is an 
opportunity to improve theoretical grounding on the classic, extensive and solid literature on 
behavioural decision making, as well as the emerging literature and new methodologies using 
for example neural science (Powell, 2011). 
Inspired by Behavioural Strategy, we propose the concept of ‘Behavioural Project’, as 
a host and umbrella term for research on behaviours in decisions in projects. We will argue 
that this emerging body of research addresses the question: how can the application of 
cognitive and social psychology to decisions in projects help the understanding of key project 
challenges and successes? In addressing this question, we will contribute to a stronger 
grounding of the managing of project in realistic assumptions about human cognition, 
emotion, and social interaction. 
This article will portray the current state of this emerging area of research in projects 
and propose a theoretical framework to organise and inspire research on behavioural decision 
making in projects, and by this means, address the three gaps identified above. In line with 
arguments proposed by Knudsen (2003) in Organisation Theory and Söderlund (2011) in 
project management, we suggest that research in behavioural decisions in projects will benefit 
from a balance between work focused on a variety of theoretical traditions, integrating 
empirical and theoretical studies into broader frameworks that will inform practice, and 
theorising on decisions in temporary organisations.  
The article is structured as follows: First, we will introduce the proposed concept of 
Behavioural Project, and suggest a framework by linking it to three schools of Behavioural 
Strategy to decisions in projects and its related emerging literature. We then will illustrate the 
application of the Behavioural Project framework through discussion of decision behaviour in 
the Berlin Brandenburg Airport case. We conclude with reflections on implications to 
research and a suggested research agenda. 
2. Behavioural Project 
The extant research on what we call Behavioural Project has been insightful to help us 
understand some of the most intriguing and problematic behaviours in projects such as 
escalation of commitment and failure to terminate projects. As the number of contributions to 
the field is growing, it also becomes more heterogeneous and fragmented and could, 
therefore, benefit from stronger understanding of its differences and potential for integration.  
Building on the literature on Behavioural Strategy, we propose a coherent conceptual 
framework to organize empirical and theoretical observations so researchers in the field can 
make sense of the field’s boundaries, assumptions, major findings, challenges, potential future 
research (Shapira, 2011), within and across areas established in the framework. Indeed, we 
can only connect what we are consciously aware of.  
We develop the conceptual framework for ‘Behavioural Projects’ based on the 
application of three theoretical schools from the Behavioural Strategy proposed by Powell et 
al (2011) to the context of projects in general and to behavioural decision making in projects 
in particular. The latter is developed by applying the three schools to the three types of project 
decisions as suggested by Rolstådas and Pinto (2015). 
The framework helps researchers to understand the differences and similarities across 
the research domains, and identify specific gaps within each domain. As we structure the 
research across specific schools with solid theoretical traditions, we encourage careful 
grounding of research on the classic and emerging research on cognitive and social 
psychology in general and that applied to organizational contexts in particular. Finally, the 
framework can also counteract fragmentation by encouraging integration of knowledge across 
different schools to improve our understanding of the complex context of project decisions.  
In the next paragraphs we will explore the schools of behavioural strategy and types of 
decision, and connect them into our conceptual framework. 
Behavioural Strategy offers a solid starting point for the application of cognitive and 
social psychology to project contexts. Behavioural Strategy is an umbrella term proposed by 
Powell et al. (2011) to host research in the field of Strategy that draws on insights of social 
and cognitive psychology. Cognitive and social psychology have a long-lasting tradition in 
organization theory and strategy research. However, despite 30 years of development, the area 
lacks integration and is detached from general concerns of strategy. In 2011 Powell et al. 
called for the re-emergence of works in the area, which are more integrated, with stronger 
focus on pertinent concerns in strategy research and draws more strongly on cutting edge 
studies on psychology and behavioural economics.  
In comparison with Strategy, research on cognitive and social psychology in project 
context is limited, however, as with strategy, studies in the area are fragmented and focused 
on only some of pertinent concerns in project research and practice. Research in project also 
fails to draw on the cutting edge psychology research theories and methodologies, and rather 
recently (with exceptions) embraced classic methodologies such as experimentation. Some 
studies display also weaknesses in terms of their grounding in the classic and solid 
foundations of cognitive and social psychology. Thus, akin to Behavioural Strategy, 
‘Behaviour Project’ can act as a host of research in cognitive and social psychology in 
projects, as well as encourage research with stronger embeddedness and understanding of the 
traditions and emerging trends in psychology research. 
In order to do so, it is useful to be more explicit as to the different traditions in 
cognitive and social psychology, and their applications into organizational contexts. That is 
where Powell et al.’s (2011) three schools of Behavioural Strategy are useful. Powell et al 
organize current and guide future research across three schools: Reductionist, Pluralist and 
Contextualist. We apply these three schools as three alternative but not competing views of 
behavioural decision making in projects, with different research traditions, assumptions and 
perspectives on decisions. Making them explicit assists a more careful study and integration 
of findings. In the next paragraphs we will describe the different schools in general and in 
projects. 
The Reductionist School is based on a positivist epistemology and on the works of 
Kahneman, Tversky, Slovic and Lovallo, and explores concepts like optimism bias and 
planning fallacy (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003), prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) or illusion of control (Slovic, 1987). A ‘good’ project decision in the reductionist’s 
view is a strictly rational decision that optimizes the (subjective) utility for the future 
scenario. However, reductionist do not assume rational behaviour in ‘real life’. They take into 
account that utility theory is based on the assumption of complete information and certainty, 
which cannot be reached in real-life project. Deviation between the normative and the 
descriptive theories are identified as errors or biases. Reductionist research is concerned with 
identifying the roots of irrational decision behaviour and offers “de-biasing methods” such as 
taking the outside-view (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003), reference class forecasting 
(Flyvbjerg, 2008), introduction of a devil’s advocate and others to increase the match between 
the subjective perception of the decision maker with the assumed objective reality. 
Opposed to the paradigmatic development in the Reductionist School, the Pluralist 
School draws on a variety of theoretical traditions and research methodologies, including 
works on political science, organization theory, and social cognition psychology. Bounded 
rationality of decision makers is less of an interest to pluralists. It instead assumes that 
different stakeholders are likely to hold different opinions and have partly conflicting 
interests. From this perspective, decision makers focus on the rational and deliberate pursuit 
of one’s own interests, and the negotiation of interests across different groups. Decisions 
become, henceforth, arenas for negotiation and bargaining. As a response, the pluralist school 
is concerned with power and moral hazards, that can emerge from asymmetric information 
between parties, and focuses on the overall decision environment of organizations, including 
issues such as intergroup bargaining, politics, conflict resolution, or resource allocation.  
Pluralists do not subscribe to the image or ideal of a structured decision making 
process advocated by normative school. They accept that making decisions involves e.g. 
bargaining, discussions behind closed doors, give and take, and that such behaviour cannot 
follow a structured, step by step model. A ‘good decision’ and decision process cannot be 
prescribed per se and will involve a discussion on ‘good to whom?’. However, not everything 
goes. Pluralists suggestions to practice involve methods and practices to improve fairness and 
promote ethical behaviour. 
Finally, the Contextualist School sees decision as intrinsically connected with its 
context, organizational culture, narratives, etc. The school hosts studies with qualitative 
methodologies and mostly a socially constructed view of reality. According to this school, 
decisions are not made in a meeting, but what happens in a meeting is the consequence of 
broader sensemaking processes, where attention, priority, dominant narratives are established 
and shape any ‘decision’ in organizations. As for the Pluralist School, stakeholders in 
organizations (and projects) are seen to have different, and partly conflicting interests, 
experiences and opinions, resulting from different mental frames and ‘constructions of 
reality’.  
The Contextualist School is interested to understand the processes of convergence of 
these diverging opinions into a ‘dominant’ narrative, which will then become the ‘decision’. 
In this regard, a ‘good decision’ is one that eventually converges, and that stakeholders, by 
and large, are in line with, and accept. Decision makers are therefore not seen as a person with 
authority to make decision but an orchestrator of narratives and meaning, aspiring for 
‘convergence’ of meaning, although accepting that there will never be a single narrative 
across the project. And that is not necessarily negative, as long as the narratives as similar 
enough to instigate coordinated action.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the three schools of Behavioural Strategy applied to 
project context, and hence constituting the basis for what we called Behaviour Projects. 
Table 1: Emerging Research Program on ‘Behavioural Project’ 
 Reductionist Pluralist Contextualist 
Weltanschauung 
in relation to 
decisions 
Decisions are aspired to be 
rational, and deviations from 
rationality should be 
mitigated. 
Decisions are negotiation 
arenas, prone for conflict of 
interests, bargaining and 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Decisions are 
sensemaking 
processes. Decision 
processes are 
intertwined in 
negotiation of 
meaning, culture and 
narratives constructed 
before, during and 
even after the project. 
Assumptions 
about decision 
maker's 
behaviour 
Decision makers (or groups 
of decision makers) make 
decisions consciously as 
'events' but are bounded-
rational, and hence 
cognitively limited. 
Decision makers are rational 
and strongly influenced by 
personal and political interests, 
which can be in conflict with 
that of the project. 
Decision makers do 
not 'make' decisions, 
but are actors 
constructing narratives 
which will shape 
processes of attention, 
prioritisation and 
ultimately decisions. 
Core processes of 
interest 
Individual and intragroup 
decision making 
Intergroup bargaining, problem 
solving, politics, conflict 
resolution, organizational 
learning, resource allocation 
Sensemaking, 
perception, enactment, 
action generation 
Caricature of 
project actors 
portrayed in 
research findings 
The optimist: project actors 
suffer from ludicrous 
optimism bias 
The opportunist: project actors 
have their own interests at heart 
The orchestrator: 
project actors surf on 
waves of meaning, in 
an highly ambiguous 
world 
Key generic 
concepts in social 
and cognitive 
psychology 
Cognitive biases; heuristics; 
bounded rationality; 
subjective 
utility/probability; 
personality types, 
groupthink 
conflict culture; decision 
process (inclusion/ 
participation); intra-project 
communication; 
negotiations/bargaining; game 
theory 
Culture (Hofstede 
model), language, 
signs & symbols, 
values, taboos, 
sensemaking, 
storytelling, future 
perfect strategising 
Examples of 
topics and 
contributions in 
projects 
Optimism bias (Flyvbjerg), 
sustained false optimism 
bias (Kutsch et al 2011), 
overconfidence (Geraldi and 
Arlt, 2015), self-efficacy 
(Jani 2008, 2011), intuition 
and pattern recognition 
(Hartman 2008; Leybourne 
2006), thinking style (Tullett 
1996), personality types 
(Cohen, 2013), perception 
filters (Van Oorschot et al 
2013) 
Strategic misrepresentation 
(Flyvbjerg), dysfunctional 
corporate culture (Chapman et 
al 2006), strategic rent seeking 
behaviour (Sanderson 2012), 
suspension of believe (Kutsch 
and Hall 2010), political filters 
of evidence (Haji-Kazemi et al 
2015) 
Future perfect (Pitsis et 
al 2003), taboos 
(Kutsch and Hall 
2010), untopicability 
(Kutsch and Hall 
2010), stakeholder’s 
involvement (Shapira 
et al 1994), project 
sensemaking and 
turnaround (Musca et 
al 2014), culture (de 
Camprieu et al 2007), 
framing of decisions 
(Ojiako et al 2014) 
Typical 
methodologies 
Positivist research, marked 
by experimental research, 
modelling and simulation 
Critical realist, socio 
constructivist, marked by 
qualitative and multi-method 
tradition. 
Socio constructivist, 
marked by qualitative, 
in-depth studies, 
ethnography, grounded 
theorising. 
Examples of 
classic 
contributors 
Edwards, Simon, Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern, 
Tversky-Kahneman, 
Schelling, Bazerman, 
Loewenstein, Lovallo 
March, Cyert, Simon, Fiske-
Taylor, Bower, Miller, Kets de 
Vries, Hambrick, Levinthal, 
Denrell, Bromiley, Rumelt, 
Winter 
Weick, Starbuck, 
Pettigrew, Brunsson, 
March, Staw, 
Mintzberg, 
Abrahamson, Reger, 
Huff, Fiol, Milliken, 
Hodgkinson, Bettis, 
Mitroff 
Source: Based on Powell et al (2011, p. 1372) populated with examples of articles from a 
structured literature review on decisions in projects (Stingl and Geraldi, Work in Progress) 
 
Our next step in the development of framework to organize and guide research on behavioural 
decision making in projects is the explicit application of the different schools to specific 
decision making situations and challenges in projects.  
While decisions in projects may vary greatly with regard to scope, impact, level of 
documentation and formalization, involvement of stakeholders and others, Rolstadås, Pinto et 
al. (2015) have proposed a simple framework1 that categorize decisions in projects into three 
types: selection, authorization, and plan decisions. The framework is helpful to contextualize 
the theoretical ideas discussed above to decisions in projects.  
Authorization decisions are either/or decisions, typically yes/no, go/no-go, carry 
on/terminate decisions. These decisions should ideally consider whether the proposed option 
(the "yes", "go" or “termination”) is beneficial for different stakeholders, the organizations 
involved and/or the project as a whole. The decision problem is therefore centred around the 
prospective outcomes of the proposed course of action. Behavioural, cognitive, social and 
cultural factors may affect the perception of the future with regard to e.g. uncertainty, cause 
and effect between action and outcome as well as the perception of potential utility, and to 
whom, with which consequences to dominant discourses and power relations.  
Selection decisions describe the choice between a set of alternatives and are 
concerned with which alternative(s) provide the best utility to stakeholder’s, the project's or 
organisations' goals. As such, selection decisions involve the consideration of a broader range 
of factors than in authorisation decisions. To understand selection decisions we need to 
explore how decision makers develop, compare and prioritize options. Actors involved in 
such decisions are therefore also pondering what information to use, what objectives are 
considered, who would benefit from such alternatives, how to bring alternatives to the pool of 
options, how to discredit options. 
1 At first sight, one might argue that concepts from Rolstådas are inappropriate to apply concepts of behavioral 
decision theories to projects. Rolstådas and colleagues suggest a decision making approach - the ‘project 
decision chain’ that is in line with descriptive decision theories. Its motivation is to counteract the seemingly 
unstructured and poorly documented decision processes in projects by introducing a structured and fact-based 
approach to decisions. Such structured view on decisions would be at odds with pluralist and contextualist 
schools. However, although the method itself has a strong bias towards descriptive theories, the typology is 
generic and not as much coloured by its roots. Instead, they are interesting to recognise different dynamics and 
potential behaviors were the decision framed as an authorisation, selection or plan decisions. 
                                                          
Finally, plan decisions, while at the core similar to authorization decisions, consider 
decisions to establish what to do, how and when. Therefore this decision involves an 
evaluation of whether the plan (or change in plan) is feasible, and what should be changed or 
reconsidered in order to increase feasibility. The decision is characterized by ambiguity, 
technical knowledge and information asymmetry. As plans will constantly change and need to 
be readapted to emerging situations in the projects (Dvir and Lechler, 2004), this type of 
decision also involves the development of a governance structure and mechanism of control 
that will maintain an oversight of the project across its life cycle. 
Table 2: Overview of different types of decisions 
Type Core question Illustration of common 
decision challenge 
Core preoccupation of 
decision makers 
Authorization 
decision 
Are the expected 
outcomes of the 
proposed course of 
action beneficial/ 
desirable? (To 
whom?) 
Project termination: failure to 
terminate failing projects, 
leading to excessive costs and 
reputational damage, among 
others 
• perceived expected 
outcomes  
• weighing of 
gains/losses 
Selection 
decision 
Which option does 
provide the best result 
(and to whom, why)? 
Technology selection: failure 
to select appropriate 
technology for the specific 
situation 
• formal and perceived 
priorities, objectives 
and interests at play 
• perceived outcome of 
actions/ decisions 
• subjective utility of 
expected outcomes 
Plan decision Is the (planning) 
framework suitable to 
attain the desired 
objectives? Does it 
provide appropriate 
governance and 
control? 
Endorsement of project plan: 
bottlenecks in resource 
availability are not considered, 
cost and duration are 
underestimated, prospective 
benefits are overestimated 
• objectives 
• expectation of future 
challenges 
• effectivity of 
available tools on 
maintaining course 
(cause-effect 
considerations)  
Table 3 combines the schools of Behaviour Projects to the specific decision types, and 
suggests how schools provide alternative but not necessarily competing perspectives on 
specific decision situations.  
Table 3: Application of Behavioural Project Schools to Decision Types 
Decision 
Type 
Reductionist Pluralist Contextualist 
Authorisation 
Decision 
Cognitive limitations 
impairs decision makers’ 
ability to develop accurate 
estimations, understand 
interdependencies and 
evaluate the project or 
change order, leading to 
biased estimations 
and  perceptions of current 
status, future prospects, 
gains vs. losses. 
Decision makers are 
cognisant and potentially 
rational, but their decision 
to e.g. sanction or 
terminate a project is 
highly influenced by own 
interests and objectives. 
Accurate information may 
be omitted deliberately 
due to political interests. 
Evaluation of project’s prospect 
(or e.g. change order) is the 
result of a complex 
organizational sensemaking 
process, where dominant 
narrative comes to surface, or 
actors are unable to reach an 
agreement (convergence of 
different ways of understanding 
the situation) and adjourn. 
Dominant narrative can serve 
different interests and can be 
perceived by some as 
detrimental. 
Selection 
Decision 
Decision maker’s limited 
cognition hampers 
comparison between 
different options and their 
potential combinations.  
Thereby, relevant criteria 
or options may be 
disregarded, or wrongly 
evaluated. 
The decision maker (or 
the individual providing 
critical information) 
defends options that 
would best serve one’s 
own interests and 
deliberately identify and 
promote evidences 
supporting their views, 
and demerits that 
opposing it. 
Options for evaluation 
are not developed as a 
result of problem, but 
solutions endorsed by 
different organizational 
actors look for 
problems, and surface 
when they find 
opportunities to do so.  
Potential alternatives are 
developed in line with what 
could be developed through 
the current organizational 
language and which have 
potential to be accepted, 
thereby other options might be 
overlooked.  
Project managers and other 
relevant stakeholders will 
shape narratives to develop 
options that are more 
acceptable to the project, i.e. a 
success narrative to avoid 
project termination. 
Plan Decision The decision maker has a 
biased perception on the 
effectiveness of plan and 
prospective future 
(uncertainty, controllability 
of risks,..), and does not 
perceive the requirements 
for suitable plans/ 
governance structure. 
The decision maker is 
aware of the general 
shortfalls of the proposed 
plan but perceives 
personal advantage in the 
execution of the proposed 
plan. 
Information providers 
deliberately hold back on 
shortfalls of the proposed 
plan. 
Different (groups of) actors 
have different understandings of 
project goals and potential paths 
to ‘get there’. The feasibility of 
a proposed plan is highly 
dependent on the actor's 
perceptions, and project 
managers and decision makers 
will attempt to create a 
convergence between different 
understandings and ‘approve’ an 
‘acceptable’ plan.  
 
3. Case Illustration 
We will examine the case of Berlin Brandenburg Airport to illustrate the explanatory power 
of ‘Behavioural Projects’ schools and their application to decisions. The case has received 
strong media coverage, especially since the indefinitely postponed inauguration in 2012.  
Berlin Brandenburg International (BBI) is an airport under construction, intended to 
serve as sole commercial airport for Germany’s capital Berlin and replacing the two existing 
airports Tegel and Schönefeld. While ideas for a single airport had been floating around since 
the early nineties, following Germany’s reunification, the actual project initiation was based 
on the decision of the Berlin Parliament in 2004 to develop the new airport on an area 
adjacent to Schönefeld Airport. The project plan published in 2006 proposed a budget of 2.83 
bEUR and an opening date in October 2011. Both the planning and construction phases faced 
a series of major changes, partly due to alterations in EU safety regulation, and partly due to 
changes in the vision for the finalized airport introduced by both the airport company and 
Berlin politicians. These scope changes included i.a. a considerable increase in estimations of 
future passengers, which led to an increase in the size of the airport, addition of terminals 
suitable for the particularly large Airbus A380, and the inclusion of a mall-like shopping area. 
Several of these changes have been introduced only at very late planning stages in project. 
The opening date was firstly rescheduled in late 2010 to May 2012. Just days before 
the newly scheduled opening, it was further postponed due to major deficiencies in the fire 
alarm system, that resulted in a withheld licence to operate. Since then, the opening date has 
been postponed several times with no definitive date currently scheduled. Furthermore both 
excessive cost overruns - the current cost estimate is at 5.4 bEUR -,  and significant technical 
issues and construction failures became public. As a consequence of the apparent failures 
during the planning and construction phase, linked in the public perception with  poor 
construction planning, management, execution and corruption, both the general manager of 
the airport company, Rainer Schwarz, and the main planning bureau gmp were dismissed in 
2013 (a series of further dismissals followed).  
An investigation committee (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, 2012) has been established by 
the Berlin Parliament in 2012. While they have not yet finished their investigations on the 78 
plus 11 questions (an amendment with additional questions has been issued in 2014) 
regarding causes, consequences and responsibilities for cost overrun and delays of the still 
ongoing project, details of their findings during public committee meeting have been 
published in national German media. We based our analysis on those publicly available 
information.  
We analyse the case from three angles represented in the different schools of 
Behavioural Project: reductionist, pluralist and contextualist. We will justify the propositions 
through theoretical arguments and propose approaches to research the relevance of the 
theories for the observed behaviour. As information about the project is limited and access to 
raw data like e-mail communication is not available, the analysis is based on the few available 
cues and complemented by behavioural decision making theories. Our analysis is not more 
than conjunctions on what could have influenced the project’s poor project results. The 
objective of the analysis is illustrate differences and similarities across the three schools, and 
not to argue on the ‘real’ reasons for airport’s poor project results.  
Throughout the project we can observe all three decision types, as it would be 
expected in any project. We have chosen to focus our illustrative example on the 
authorization decisions, because they were especially relevant on the level of the supervisory 
board where a series of changes in scope where authorized, that are now partly the focus of 
the investigation committee.  
For the illustration of the cases, we will focus on the authorization decisions, because 
they expressed particularly destructive force when they were related to (the constant) change 
of scope. We will consider only those changes that were triggered internally and not through 
external safety regulation. The architect, von Gerkan, reported on this topic later "The clients 
were tripping over each other with requests for changes" (Hammer, 2015)  
According to the investigations, the increasing number of authorizations for change of 
scope eventually was a key contributor to high cost overruns and the technical chaos that is 
responsible for the ongoing delay of the opening. Retrospective analysis of these change 
authorizations indicate a potential insufficient regard to risks, cascading effects across 
different areas of the project, and the related impacts on costs and schedules appropriately into 
account. How do the different schools explain this increasing number of changes? 
A reductionist view would focus on understanding the cognitive biases of the key 
actors on the client and contractor side. A likely reductionist explanation is optimism bias. 
Optimism bias is a general term for a subset of various cognitive biases like self-efficacy 
theory (Whyte et al., 1997), illusion of control (Slovic, 1976), self-efficacy (Kutsch et al., 
2011), and others. In the project context, optimism bias is relevant as a potential source for 
biased forecasts (Flyvbjerg, 2013), either through overestimation of benefits, underestimation 
of costs, or underestimation of risks. As such, it may influence authorization decisions 
through biased provision of information or an distorted cognitive perception of available 
information.  
In this regard, optimism bias attributes the failure in the authorisation decision to 
overly optimistic analysis of what would be required to execute the endorsed change, and the 
related risks, cascading effects across different areas of the project, and impact on costs and 
schedules.  
One key driver for optimism bias identified in the literature is high perceived self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy is a type of self-evaluation describing the individual’s perceived ability 
to perform tasks in a way that will result in a satisfactory outcome (Bandura, 1978). In this 
case, the mistake in considering consequences of changes is related to decision makers’ 
believe that, although other people would have difficulties in implementing the changes 
within the constraints of the project, they would be better and quicker at the job, and hence, 
succeed. Literature links high perceived self-efficacy with mastery experience, i.e. a 
successful track record (Bandura, 1986, 1997, 2002 - as cited in Steyn and Mynhardt, 2008), 
observation of other people’s success (vicarious experience) and external re-enforcement such 
as verbal persuasion (Bandura 1997). 
The main actors on both the client's and the contractors side, CEO Schwarz and 
architect von Gerkan, were at the time of their appointment considered amongst the best 
within their field. Rainer Schwarz, also honorary professor for air traffic, was frequently 
labeled "air traffic expert", especially in the company's external communication (Airliners.de, 
2010). Before accepting the position as CEO of BBI he has managed the German Airports 
Nürnberg and Düsseldorf, the latter one in a similar position. The expansion of his contract 
until 2016 in 2010 is arguably an additional external persuasion regarding his abilities and 
skills. We may argue therefore that the level of mastery experience as well as the external 
verbal persuasion of his abilities has been significant, inferring an increased likelihood of high 
perceived self-efficacy. 
Similar assumptions can be made for his counterpart, architect von Gerkan, owner of 
the architectural bureau Gmp that had the technical lead for the planning of the airport. Van 
Gerkan was and is one of Germany's most renowned architects and has built his career on 
large and - mostly - successful infrastructure projects like the "other" Berlin Airport, Tegel, at 
the beginning of his career, or the award winning Terminal 1 of Stuttgart Airport. Hence, 
similar to Schwarz, van Gerkan exhibits high level of mastery experience and external verbal 
persuasion (e.g. awards), which is likely to lead to an elevated perceived self-efficacy. 
  As Jani has shown in two experimental studies (2008 and 2011) high perceived task 
specific self-efficacy is correlated with an optimistic distortion of risk perception, leading to 
an underestimation of risks in (failing) projects. This means that the self-perceived ability to 
successfully complete a task distorts the objective estimation of the project or task to fail. 
Similar inferences were made by Sengupta (2008) who named this phenomenon "experience 
trap". Hence our proposition is, that the likely high level of self-efficacy of the key actors may 
have served as an amplifier for an optimism bias when evaluating the authorized changes.  
If this proposition holds true, then de-biasing methods like ‘taking the outside view’, 
proposed by Flyvbjerg (2008) based on Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) would provide a 
sensible measure to reduce the bias and thereby improve the decisions. 
Another possible factor driving optimism bias is outcome desirability, also known as 
“wishful thinking”. While the hypothesized direct impact of a particularly desirable outcome 
on the estimation of probabilities has not been fully substantiated through studies, especially 
in face of potential losses in case of the undesired outcome (Krizan and Windschitl, 2007), 
Windschitl and colleagues have found indication, that desired outcomes alter the way actors 
seek and accept new information (2013). This is in line with another cognitive bias typically 
considered in the generic literature: confirmation bias (Wason, 1960). Other than the selective 
information seeking behaviour to confirm only the desirable outcome, as described by 
Windschitl et al., confirmation bias looks at the information seeking confirmation of a 
previously reached conviction. Although implications for the project are apparent, little 
research has been performed in that context so far. Therefore the extent to which this 
information seeking behaviour is further biased in a complex project environment vs. the 
controlled laboratory environment of e.g. Windschitl’s studies has not been fully explored. 
However the generic literature suggests that a desirable outcome will alter the way actors and 
decision makers search for information and consider this information in their judgement. As 
such the desirability bias may increase the decision maker’s tendency to check for optimistic 
information and thereby may increase the likelihood of more optimistic judgments and 
decisions.  
Many of the later introduced changes that were not a consequence of EU safety 
regulations were directly linked to increasing the airport’s unique features, therefore its 
prestige and consequently the prestige of the actors leading it to a success. For each of the key 
actors, both CEO Schwarz and architect von Gerkan, but also Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit, 
a successful completion of an airport, that was perceived as surpassing in size, technology and 
design any other German airport, would arguably have led to an increase in prestige and 
provided abundant future economic and career opportunities. As such, it is likely that a 
successful completion of an exceptional airport - e.g. bigger than Frankfurt and designed to 
accommodate even the gigantic Airbus A380 (Hammer, 2015) - may have served as a highly 
desirable outcome also on the individual levels of the actors.  
Based on the generic literature we can therefore make the following proposition: A 
likely high outcome desirability may have led to a biased information seeking behaviour that 
may have been skewed towards success confirming information. Such selective attention 
could potentially have influenced their perceptions of the project, and let them focus on 
evidence confirming the feasibility of the changes and disconfirming potential issues with the 
project’s progress. 
A third exemplary factor typically associated in the generic and project specific 
literature with increased optimism bias is ‘illusion of control’ (Slovic, 1976). Individuals 
under the illusion of control perceive a reduced level of risk for activities and alternatives that 
they feel ‘in control of’ versus an increased dread - and thus overestimation - of risks that are 
perceived as out of the own sphere of control. Jani has found in simulation experiences (2008 
and 2011) that there is strong evidence for illusion of control in the project context, where 
exogenous risks (out of the actor’s control) were in general perceived significantly higher 
than endogenous risks (within control). 
In the case of the authorisation of scope changes, the core risks - especially those that 
later on materialized - were mostly of endogenous nature. Subsequent problems with the fire 
alarm system, that ultimately were the reason for the indefinite delay of the opening, were 
linked to insufficient detail planning and deficiencies in execution (RBB, 2015). All of those 
issues are concerns of project management and are not linked to external risks and 
uncertainties. Given the theoretical findings linking endogenous risks to a likely decreased 
perception of risks and consequently an over-optimistic forecast for the considered choice we 
may make the proposition that in the Berlin Brandenburg case there was an increased 
likelihood of illusion of control and thereby biased perception of the risks, costs and expected 
implementation time for the authorized changes in scope.  
We have argued that it is likely to find typical drivers for optimism bias - particularly, 
but not exclusively: high self-efficacy, high outcome desirability, and illusion of control - in 
the Berlin Brandenburg case. This leads to the overall proposition that the evaluation and 
ultimately decision to authorise the unfeasible scope changes suffered from optimism bias. 
Further reductionist theories that provide a theoretical explanation for the decision 
behaviour during the authorization of the changes may be based on Simon's concept of 
bounded rationality (1976). Given the complexity of the project and the apparent lack of full 
change documentation in later planning stages (RBB, 2015) it can be argued that the decision 
makers - and also the involved architects and planning engineers who did accept those 
changes - might not have been able to establish a comprehensive cause-effect modeling for 
the impacts of the individual changes. Additionally the dynamic nature of the introduction of 
the changes further added to the complexity of the project. In consequence, we may make the 
proposition that due to the actor’s bounded rationality and the dynamic complexity of the 
project, they failed to correctly perceive the associated risks that were introduced through the 
changes.  
While the reductionist school maintains a neutral view on the morality of the actors in 
the decision context, analyzing only possible non-deliberate biases in information provision 
and judgement, the pluralistic school searches for evidence of political or rent-seeking 
behaviour of the individual actors in the decision context. As such it assumes motivation to 
deliberately bias information and decide following individual objectives, rather than the 
project’s or organization’s goals. As those explanations are closely linked with attribution of 
vested interests and possibly unethical behaviour, an analysis of the media coverage has to be 
performed with extreme caution, as finger pointing has become abundant when the actual 
scale of the cost overrun and delay became apparent. Considering the strong tendency towards 
scapegoating in the project over the past years - all key actors of the project execution team 
have been replaced and the now insolvent construction company Imtech had absorbed a large 
amount of, likely appropriate, blame (Fuchs et al., 2015) - the available indication for 
pluralistic behaviour of the actors covered in the media is considered unreliable. An in-depth 
analysis may be possible in the future, after the investigation committee has finalized their 
report (which will not be likely before the finalization of the airport). Therefore we will make 
the case based on purely theoretical concepts allowing for an explanation of the behaviour 
during the authorization of the changes. 
The pluralistic angle generally assumes that the decision maker - or information 
provider - exploits heterogeneity in information distribution for his or her rent-seeking 
behaviour (Sanderson, 2012). This school thereby follows two main descriptive behavioural 
theories that apply to the context of authorization decisions: strategic misrepresentation of 
information (Flyvbjerg 2013, Flyvbjerg et al., 2009), i.e. the deliberate omission or biasing of 
information provided to the authorization body, and deliberate ignorance of information 
through the authorization body (Kutsch and Hall, 2010). Research has had a focus rather on 
the effects of these behaviours rather than the roots, which briefly can be characterized as 
conflicts of interests between the actors’ and the project’s objectives, leading to politicking, 
bargaining or other modes of conflict resolution (Powell, Fox and Lovallo, 2011) . 
An analysis of the questions addressed by the investigation committee 
(Abgeordnetenhaus berlin, 2012) indicates, that the Berlin Parliament was working on the 
assumption of the existence of at least a certain degree of opportunistic behaviour, when it 
was appointing the committee. Amongst other issues, the assignment focusses on the 
assessment of information quality and availability when presented to higher instances of 
authority. Some related questions are e.g. B.3. (“In which manner and to which extend where 
the [..] deputies [of the authorities] informed about the current status [..], necessary changes 
and prospective costs? Where there phases in which there were changes to the [..] procedure, 
leading to enhanced or reduced information flow?”) or  E.14. (“When did the management 
[..] identify that the costs [..] exceed [..] 2.4 billion Euro [..]? When and how detailed was the 
supervisory board and the shareholders informed about the prospective additional costs? 
[..]”)  
Next to the analysis of the quality and availability of the information, the committee is 
furthermore assigned to analyse the possibility of opportunistic interests of the actual decision 
makers linked with conflicts of interests (e.g. questions B.8 and B.9). 
There is indication that concerns regarding the feasibility of at least some of the 
changes were floating around already during the planning stage and even more so during 
changes introduced during the implementation stage. Architect von Gerkan later stated that 
his bureau has not sufficiently made a stand against the recurring episodes of confusion and 
standstill resulting from these changes. He characterized this lack of opposition as “by far our 
biggest mistake” (DPA, 2014). The pluralistic angle therefore needs to raise the question, why 
no one spoke up. Several concepts may be considered for explanation, for instance taboo 
(Kutsch and Hall, 2010), groupthink (Janis, 1982) or voice behaviour (Morrison, 2011).  The 
consideration of voice behaviour, that is the articulation of concerns, suggestions, or critique 
in the intent of improvement as extra-role behaviour, is especially interesting as it has not 
been linked to purely politically motivated behaviour but also to roots in contextual and 
cognitive processes (Ekrot et al, 2015). 
A review of the contextualist school’s potential analysis of the decision is 
fundamentally different from the previous two sections, as it is not rooted in the assumption 
of a right versus wrong decision. While it is vain to discuss a possible missing convergence in 
perception of success for the project at hand - as it so obviously failed on so many levels - we 
may look at the contextualist theories that may serve as an explanation for the framing of the 
decision environment during the planning and implementation phase. As stated in the 
description of the pluralistic view, there is indication that existing concerns regarding 
feasibility were not developed into grounded opposition or were simply not articulated. The 
contextualist school offers a variety of theoretical models that may explain the emerge of a 
dominant narrative that suppressed the emerge of other conflicting or competing narratives 
(REF). Relevant for the consideration of what happened during the authorization decisions are 
foremost Boje’s antenarrative concept as well as the concept of future perfect strategizing, 
firstly proposed by (Schütz, 1967), and applied to project contexts by Pitsis et al (2003). 
Boje characterizes antenarratives as “prospective (future-looking) bets (antes)” that are 
“fragile[..], like the butterfly” and are “sometimes able to change the future, to set changes 
and transformation in motion that have impact on the big picture” (Boje, 2008). A review of 
media articles during the planning and early construction phase provides evidence for a 
pronounced and dominant positive antenarrative that went well beyond the directly involved 
project actors. When, for instance the CEO of the discount airline EasyJet, John Kohlsaat, 
doubted the profitability of the terminal, it were other airlines that came to the project’s 
defense: “There is no reason to badmouth the project today.” (Lufthansa) or “The planning 
[..] is completed and needs to be realized as quickly as possibly.” (Air Berlin) (dw.com, 
2009). Similar evidence of the dominating optimistic narrative can be found in the press 
communication of Berlin City Hall, quoting Mayor Wowereit in a reaction to EasyJet’s 
critique, that the airport will “not be an overdimensioned ‘marble palace’ but neither a 
‘Quonset’. The budget needs to be kept.” (Berlin.de, 2006). This harsh reaction to doubts 
regarding the necessity of the ‘grandeur’ of the terminal design is in line with expected 
behaviour when a dominant narrative is faced with a competing marginal narrative. 
Future perfect strategizing on the other hand provides conceptual explanation for the 
creation of the dominant narrative. Especially relevant for our case may be the 
Endgaming  strategy (Clegg et al., 2002; Pitsis et al., 2003). Endgaming is a type of 
leadership that is focused strongly on creating a very clear vision of the “end game” of the 
project by being very specific about milestones, targets and future achievements. Again the 
external communication of the project actors during the planning and early construction phase 
(2006-2009) provides plenty of evidence of Endgaming-language: 
“The new airport will vault the capital region in a new league. [..] Mayor Wowereit stated, 
BBI is a guarantee for ten thousands of new jobs” (Berlin.de 2006) 
“BBI provides the unique chance to catch up with the global streams of traffic of the global 
economy” (Matthias Platzeck, Premier of Brandenburg) (FBB, 2009) 
“2011 the German capital region will [..] receive a powerful airport with which it may 
advance into the top 10 of European air traffic locations” (Rainer Schwarz, CEO of BBI) 
(FBB, 2009) 
While the constructive perspective of the contextualist school generally has been 
focused on the positive aspects of converging framing, we may argue that in the case of Berlin 
Brandenburg the creation of a powerful optimistic narrative may eventually have contributed 
to the challenges and subsequent failures in the project.  
The three schools provide potential explanations to decision behaviour in the case of 
authorization decisions regarding internally driven scope changes for the Berlin Brandenburg 
airport. However, the focus to one explanation model or one school will, ultimately, provide a 
limited understanding of the case, and not allow us to understand the full picture. 
We believe, that there is a likely reinforcement of the effects described in the 
individual theories when taking a comprehensive view on the decision environment. We 
propose, for example, that the creation of the dominant positive narrative through pronounced 
endgaming may have directly impacted the voice behaviour of other actors by creating an 
environment where open articulation of project risks may have threatened political, 
economical or career interests of the actor (pluralistic behaviour). Conversely the lack of 
opposition to the dominating narrative may have served as cement for its position in the 
sensemaking process of the actors and their future perception of new cues and information.  
Also, we may argue that the existence of the vision of the finalized grand airport may 
have served as an amplifier for cognitive biases like conformity, groupthink, outcome 
desirability and delusional optimism.  Conversely the resulting selective and biased 
perception of information may have served as a reinforcement of the constructed reality and 
the forming of individual strategic opinions. 
It is likely that an in-depth understanding of these self-enforcing effects, possible 
feedback loops and dependencies between the descriptive theories would serve as a strong 
foundation in order to develop strategies and methods to cope with potentially destructive 
decision behaviour, as observed in the presented case. 
Therefore, we propose an integration of the theories and schools rather than an isolated 
consideration of factors driving decision behaviour. By looking at decision behaviour with an 
integrated view of the different schools we expect to move forward from the descriptive 
angle, that is currently dominating in the contextualist and pluralistic school, to a stronger 
middle range theorising with implications and guidance to improving decisions in practice. In 
this regard, Winch (2013) study of the Channel fixed link provides an excellent example of 
how different theories across the three schools (future perfect strategizing - contextualist), 
escalation of commitment (reductionist) and strategic misrepresentation (pluralist) not only 
coexist but also reinforce one another. Therefore, studying behaviours in decisions in projects 
will require both in-depth understanding of theories within each school as well as integration 
between these theories. The second gain particular in relevance as we move from 
contributions to theory to contributions to practice of managing projects. 
4. Discussion and Research Agenda 
In this section, we build on the conceptual framework proposed above and suggest an agenda 
for future research based on the intersection between different areas of the framework (see 
Figure 1). The areas are not meant to be comprehensive nor suggest THE research agenda for 
the future, instead, they should act as inspiration and invitation to build research in the area. 
 
Figure 1: Modes of connecting schools in Behavioural Projects 
4.1.Study within each School 
While there is an emergent research within the schools and partly even across schools, the 
literature review and case illustration has identified a series of interesting fields for further 
research within all of the three schools. 
Due to the high attention that cognitive biases have received in the past years in the 
cognitive and behavioural sciences, there is an abundant source of generic literature and 
theories that may have significant impact in the project context as well. We found, however, 
that the reductionist research in the field of project decisions and project management has 
expressed a very strong focus on the issue of escalation of commitment and over-optimistic 
forecasts, and various explanation strategies for these phenomena like optimism bias, illusion 
of control (see Table 2). Clearly, those phenomena are in close relation with the most 
prominent project fallacies, cost overruns and delays due to ill-designed forecasts or failure in 
risk management. However, other decision problems and biases are also relevant and 
insightful. For example, a behaviour well documented in behavioural decision making 
literature but just - if at all - a side note in the reviewed literature (Kutsch et al., 2011; 
Sengupta, 2008), is the bias of anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) which we expect to 
be observable to a large extent in the areas of forecasting and for plan decisions in general. 
For example, pricing indicated in bidding phase or early sanction of projects can impact our 
understanding of how much the project should cost, and hence lead to a perception of cost 
overrun, even though the project scope has changed and, consequently, also the budget. 
Research could explore, for example, to what extend the anchoring affect perception of 
success and failure and why? How would the anchoring bias be altered if the language used in 
early phases of the project would be different, e.g. not numbers but probabilities or ranges are 
provided?  
Another promising area of research is the confirmation bias as described by Wason 
(1960). The related biased search for information and biased interpretation of information to 
maintain conformity with a prior assumption may provide relevant insight on phenomena like 
the ignorance of early warning signs or expand the set of explanations for failed project 
termination. 
These are not but two examples. We do expect, that it will be possible to find evidence 
for other biases in the project context, for instance when it comes to selection of preferred 
modes of action or technology. Behaviour that we might expect to observe in those cases may 
be linked to recency bias, dread risks, prospect theory and many other. McCray et al (2002) 
provides an overview suggesting impact of several other potential biases and heuristics across 
the different phases of the project, which can inspire further research on biases and heuristics 
in projects. 
Additionally the researched biases were largely related to what we earlier classified as 
intra-personal cognitive biases, i.e. types of biases that manifest and express in a single 
person, namely the decision maker or the information provider. The generic literature is 
however rich in behaviour, that we have called inter-personal biases, i.e. biases that are 
created through the interaction of individuals. The most prominent of such biases is 
groupthink (Janis 1982), which has been explored by a few studies in project context,  but we 
would also expect effects from phenomena like conformity bias, Abilene paradox, and others. 
We may expect that those biases can have significant impact on areas like risk assessment - 
e.g. through failure to identify new and unknown risks or the reluctance of a single individual 
in the group to express a deviating assessment of certain risks - but also with regard to the 
hidden profile bias (Lightle et al., 2008), where the selection is focussed on the things that 
“everybody knows” rather than discussing those things with heterogeneously distributed 
knowledge amongst the team members.  
Finally, we contend that the research on the reductionist school, both in strategy and in 
projects, is strongly focused on the negative implications of our limited cognition. The 
reductionist research in cognitive psychology has started to consider the notion of heuristics 
as potentially beneficial to decisions in complex and highly uncertain environments (Artinger 
et al. 2015). As argued by  Gigerenzer since the late 90ies. To our knowledge, this positive 
spin on heuristics is currently not explored in the project context. Consequently biases are 
analysed for their "potential to negatively impact [..] activities [..] in a given project" 
(McCray, 2002) and the research focuses on methods to "offset" their effect (de-biasing 
methods). Following the findings of the generic research in cognitive sciences, we would 
expect, that heuristics, if applied purposefully and ecologically rational have the potential to 
also positively impact project activities. While there have been findings that the level of 
experience increases the use of intuition and improvisation in project decisions (Leybourne 
and Sadler-Smith, 2006), there is limited indication to when does intuition yield ‘better’ 
decisions than attempted for ‘rational decisions’. If we were to truly accept that projects are 
uncertain and that evidence provided is incomplete and potentially biased, we need to accept 
the potential ‘accuracy’ of intuitive judgments. This area offers interesting research 
opportunities for the future. It could be studied, for example, what extend the deliberate 
increased use of intuition would enable better decisions and positively impact project 
outcomes?  
Research could also address the impact of experience in decisions in projects. There 
has been a significant body of research in behavioural decision making with partly 
contradicting results with regards to the relationship between experience and ‘decision 
quality’. Project context offers an interesting context for research the impact of experience in 
decisions, as experience in managing projects is inherently different from experience in other 
types of activities such as baseball players, who would repeat the same ‘situation’ 
uncountable number of times. Project managers, in contrast, will manage only a few projects 
in their career and hence repeatability is limited. However, there are some decisions which 
tend to repeat themselves frequently in the course of projects, such as the development of 
estimations, bidding processes (Davies and Brady 2004), supplier selection, or prioritisation 
of workpackages. In such cases, experienced project managers could develop specific 
successful heuristics and experience could therefore have a positive impact on decisions.  
In this line, further studies could build on Eisenhard’s concept of simple rules (e.g. 
Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011) and apply it to project contexts - can we build robust simple 
rules in projects? Do they already exist? What are they? Why do they work? And when?  
All of the above are only examples of the research on reductionist schools. Similarly, 
further studies could explore authorisation, selection and plan decisions in the other two 
schools. When compared to the reductionist and contextualist school, literature within the 
pluralistic school is relatively scarce, in particular research that explicitly focuses on 
decisions, and promotes a pragmatic angle on what could be done and how could one respond 
to political behaviour in projects. Most of the work is rooted on Flyvbjerg’s criticism on 
forecasters strategically representing future expectations (2013) as well as on the issue of 
deliberate ignorance as discussed by Kutsch and Hall (2010), or more theoretical discussions 
on power, and governmentality (Clegg et al., 2002), as well as pragmatic yet general 
discussions on the importance of political behaviour in projects (Pinto, 1996). However all 
identified pluralistic literature in decisions is rooted in a strictly descriptive approach - in his 
work Flyvbjerg explicitly states that his proposed de-biasing framework (2007), to take the 
outside view and thereby reduce optimism bias, fails in the face of political and self-interest 
driven behaviour. With Pinto (Accidental profession), we see the phenomenon of 
opportunistic and strategic behaviour is inherent to projects, and hence, not something that 
can be eradicated but that must be managed. As there is an argued link between known 
drivers of opportunistic behaviour, like incentives, personal values, belief-system, contractual 
frameworks, and others, we propose further exploration how those drivers can be managed in 
a way that political and opportunistic behaviour may unfold in not against the interests of the 
project and organization. As we will argue below, development of a normative pluralistic 
theory may also require a stronger integration of findings and theories from both the 
reductionist and the contextualist school.   
For the contextualist school we observed similarly to the pluralistic school a dominant 
descriptive approach. However, unlike the reductionist school, contextualists focused also on 
successful practices and projects, and hence provide a often a positive angle to decisions. As 
such the contextualist described how convergence of frames and sensemaking contributed to 
project and organizational success (e.g. Pitsis et al 2003) rather than identifying dysfunctional 
projects where such convergence was missing. We may expect to find evidence for perception 
of failing projects or “bad” decisions for those projects where there is limited convergence in 
the framing between different groups with alternative narratives and understandings the 
project’s ‘reality’ (e.g. Pellegrinelli and Murray-Webster 2011), and potential studies on 
approaches to improve convergence. 
4.2.Integration across different project decisions 
Next to a possible closure of gaps between theories in the generic literature and their 
application within the project context, we also expect further fruitful research opportunities 
when considering different behavioural theories across different decision types or patterns 
that influence decisions across the entire project. Mostly, research on the relevance of the 
theoretical concepts in the project context have been limited to only a single type of decisions, 
e.g. drivers of optimism bias to either biased forecasts (plan decisions) or failure to terminate 
(authorization decision). We believe such a research could provide interesting insights as, like 
we have argued earlier, the three decision types consider aspects of the decision environment 
in a type-specific way, and search for and process information considerably different. We 
believe that a comprehensive consideration how the different decision behaviours influence a 
project from the first plan decisions, throughout selection and authorization decisions, we 
could deepen the general understanding of contextual factors impacting behaviours in 
decisions, as well as the antecedents and consequences of the behaviours. This would enable 
middle range theorising and contribute to our understanding of behaviours in temporary 
organizations which can also lead to potential theoretical contribution to the general 
behaviour decision theory. It has also potential for development of practical guidance for 
practitioners that span different decisions, and make them aware of behaviours that tend to 
develop more or less fruitful context for project.  
4.3.Integration across schools 
As already briefly mentioned when discussing research gaps for the pluralistic school, a 
rapprochement of the schools may enhance our understanding of the behavioural phenomena 
at work. A small number of publication has already tried to compare and combine the 
explanatory power of the different epistemological and ontological angles (e.g. Sanderson, 
2012; Haji-Kazemi et al., 2015; Winch, 2013). However, these works have only offered a 
bouquet of different explanatory theories that are considered individually and less attention 
has been given to how they interact. Consequently, they do not offer an integrated view on 
these theories. We argue however, that by consideration of interactions between cognitively 
limited perception, sensemaking and framing, and the individual system of values and 
objectives, we may develop a framework that allows us to understand, and in consequence 
improve decision in line with the understanding of ‘good decisions’ within each of the 
schools, therewith inform managers and decision makers. This line of research is in line with 
Powell, Fox and Lovallo’s (2011) call for integration of theories in Behavioural Strategy. 
4.4.Integration across the decision types 
Another potential area for research is the integration across different decision types. 
Here we suggest two types of study. First, studies that are inspired by theories used in 
different types of decisions. For example, how theories that have been successful in 
explaining behaviour in decision to terminate projects could also be helpful in understanding 
evaluation of feasibility of plans, or how integrative approaches such as that proposed by 
Winch (2013) focusing on the problem of escalation of project’s cost and duration can be also 
useful to explore other typical challenges related to decision in projects, such as the delay in 
recognising and acting on early warning signs. Such cross-fertilization would, overall, help in 
the generalisation of research findings beyond the different decision contexts. The second 
form of integration here could be the integration of different theories within each school to 
explain behaviour in projects.  
4.5.‘Successful’ projects and project managers 
Moreover, current studies have focused mostly on project failures. While this is interesting to 
understanding the potential detrimental effects of cognition, politics and sensemaking in 
projects, we miss to unravel cognition as a source of ‘project success’. As argued by Gavetti 
(2011, p. 267) “Its key insight is that superior opportunities are cognitively distant. They 
rarely correspond to common ways of thinking. The reason for this is that it is necessary to 
overcome strong behavioural bounds to pursue these opportunities.” Likewise, ‘superior’ 
cognition in projects is not only the avoidance of detrimental factors, but potentially 
something else, e.g. pattern recognition, intuition, etc. Therefore, there is a need to study 
decisions that were perceived as successful, that were perceived to be fundamental in the 
building of successful project stories, and decisions of people who are considered as ‘great 
project leaders’. 
5. Concluding notes 
As we have argued, behavioural projects provide us with a structured and interesting research 
framework that yet has many unexplored areas. As we have demonstrated using the Berlin 
Brandenburg case, there is a strong argument for approaching and integrating the three 
behavioural decision schools to explore decision behaviour in the project context. Such an 
integrated approach has a potentially significant impact on both further development of 
middle range theory and foremost in practice. 
This paper was based on an ongoing structured literature review to which we have 
referenced on several occasions. As the literature review has not yet been finalized there is a 
limitation regarding the range of literature considered for our claims. The next step will be the 
finalization of the literature review, which will result in a stronger claim regarding the gaps in 
the research framework and proposition for future research in the field of behavioural 
projects. 
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